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Policy Forum
This is the second in a series of articles 
on conducting research during complex 
humanitarian emergencies. The first is at 
PLoS Med 5(4): e89. doi:10.1371/journal.
pmed.0050089
The effects of crises (man-made or natural disasters) on physical health are ultimately 
quantifiable as a rise in mortality. 
Precise and unbiased estimates of 
mortality rates (deaths per person-
time) or excess death tolls (deaths 
attributable to the presence of the 
crisis) are critical to grading the 
severity of a crisis at its onset and over 
time, and adjusting relief operations 
accordingly [1,2]. Indeed, the onset of 
emergencies is commonly defined as 
a doubling of mortality rate from the 
pre-crisis baseline, or the crossing of 
fixed thresholds, typically one death 
per 10,000 person-days [2]. In reality, 
because mortality increases only after 
a crisis has evolved, acute malnutrition 
may be a better indicator for early crisis 
detection [3], and data on morbidity 
and on the coverage of interventions 
against the main known risk factors for 
poor health outcomes (e.g., insufficient 
water and sanitation, lack of preventive 
and curative health services, etc.) are 
more useful to target relief programmes 
and minimise preventable deaths. 
Mortality data also provide a basis for 
advocacy, which may be “humanitarian” 
(calling for appropriate assistance) 
or “political” (for example, calling 
for compliance with international 
humanitarian law [IHL], a set of rules 
that seek to limit the effects of armed 
conflict for humanitarian reasons 
[see http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/html/humanitarian-law-
factsheet]). As historical documents, 
mortality data also illuminate the 
consequences of humanity’s failures 
to resolve conflicts non-violently and 
to protect vulnerable groups from war 
or disasters. In Table 1, we outline 
these two main functions of mortality 
data—the support of relief operations 
and evidence-building for advocacy/
documentation. However, we believe 
that both functions can often be served 
simultaneously. In this article, we 
attempt to summarise how mortality 
within crisis-affected populations is 
documented at present, discuss our 
perceptions of the barriers to better 
mortality measurement, and suggest 
ways by which these barriers might 
be overcome (see Box 1 for the main 
suggested actions).
Current Tools for Measuring 
Mortality 
Prospective surveillance. The gold 
standard tools for monitoring 
mortality are vital registration systems 
complemented by frequent census 
exercises. However, these tools were 
missing or deficient in all recent 
high-mortality crises (such as in 
Darfur, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo [DRC], and Angola), 
with the exception of Bosnia, where 
vital registration systems continued 
to function throughout the war 
[4]. Hence, guidelines for health 
interventions in crises recommend 
establishing prospective mortality 
surveillance as a top priority, either 
by strengthening existing health 
information systems or creating 
new ones [5–9]. Generally, such 
surveillance involves daily or weekly 
visits to households by community 
health workers who also update 
population figures (in high density 
communities, monitoring of burials 
is sometimes an alternative [10]). 
Real-time analysis of trends enables 
timely reaction to deteriorating 
conditions [1]. For example, in 1992, 
United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) data from 
Ghundum II Camp showed that 
Burmese refugee girls had a higher 
mortality rate than boys and were less 
likely to attend clinics. This resulted in 
the host nation (Bangladesh) waiving 
treatment fees: within weeks, excess 
female mortality disappeared [11].
While hard to gauge, the adoption of 
comprehensive mortality surveillance 
globally appears very limited. We 
believe that this results in loss of life 
and inappropriate resource allocation 
in at least two ways. Firstly, agencies 
do not invest in observing mortality 
prospectively, and secondly, agencies 
underestimate mortality due to 
insufficient monitoring of surveillance 
systems (the sensitivity of ascertaining 
deaths by surveillance tends to decay 
unless data collection teams are 
supervised). Many agencies may simply 
not realise the indirect connection 
between timely data and improved 
health. An exception are the refugee 
camps managed by UNHCR, where 
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surveillance is commonly implemented 
and standardised. But in addition 
to the 8 million refugees worldwide 
[12], 25 million people are internally 
displaced [13] and many more live in 
crisis conditions; thus, the majority 
of crisis-affected populations are not 
under surveillance.
We could only find one recent study 
that systematically evaluated mortality 
surveillance in multiple crisis settings 
[14], and we know of no guidelines on 
mortality surveillance implementation 
in crises. Yet surveillance is probably 
cost-beneficial and feasible in all but 
the most extreme conditions. We 
suggest an international initiative to 
foster its use, define best practices, and 
harmonise tools, as recently advocated 
for stable settings [15].
Retrospective surveys. Humanitarian 
agencies often resort to surveys 
instead of surveillance (or sometimes 
they do neither). In retrospective 
mortality surveys, representative 
samples of households are interviewed 
about demographic events within the 
household (births, deaths, arrivals 
and departures) over a given period 
up to the present, yielding mortality 
Table 1. Aims and Requirements of Mortality Data Collection According to Its Function
Aims and Requirements Support to Relief Operations Advocacy and Documentation
General aims sÈ !TÈTHEÈOUTSETÈBENCHMARKÈCRISISÈSEVERITYÈANDÈIDENTIFYÈTHEÈMAINÈ
health problems
sÈ /NÈANÈONGOINGÈBASISÈMONITORÈCHANGESÈINÈHEALTHÈSTATUSÈASÈAÈPARTIALÈ
proxy of relief effectiveness), and respond to deteriorations
sÈ /NÈAÈCRISISWIDEÈLEVELÈINFORMÈFUNDINGÈDECISIONSÈANDÈIMPROVEÈAIDÈ
equity by comparing health status in different crises
sÈ (IGHLIGHTÈSYSTEMATICÈPATTERNSÈOFÈVIOLENCEÈANDÈSPECIFICÈ)(,È
violations
sÈ 3UPPORTÈADVOCACYÈINÈFAVOURÈOFÈVARIOUSÈINTERVENTIONSÈTOÈASSISTÈ
and protect
sÈ $OCUMENTÈINDIVIDUALÈINCIDENTSÈEGÈBATTLESÈMASSACRESÈ
episodes of forced displacement)
sÈ /NÈAÈCRISISWIDEÈLEVELÈQUANTIFYÈDIRECTÈANDÈINDIRECTÈDEATHÈTOLLÈ
attributable to the crisis
Specific information of interest 
to agencies commissioning data 
collection
sÈ #URRENTÈLEVELSÈOFÈMORTALITYÈINCLUDINGÈALLAGEÈUNDERÈÈYEARSÈANDÈ
neonatal; in known vulnerable groups such as orphans, the 
elderly, pregnant women, ethnic minorities)
sÈ -AINÈCAUSESÈOFÈDEATHÈEGÈINTENTIONALÈINJURYÈNONINTENTIONALÈ
injury, disease; if possible, top diseases, such as diarrhoea, 
respiratory infections, measles, etc.)
sÈ -AINÈCIRCUMSTANCESÈOFÈDEATHÈBARRIERSÈTOÈTREATMENT
sÈ 4RENDSÈINÈMORTALITYÈSINCEÈCRISISÈONSET
sÈ %XCESSÈIEÈCRISISATTRIBUTABLE	ÈMORTALITYÈASÈANÈEXCESSÈRATEÈORÈ
number of excess deaths)
sÈ -ORTALITYÈDIRECTLYÈDUEÈTOÈVIOLENCEÈINTENTIONALÈINJURYÈTRAUMA	
sÈ #AUSESÈOFÈVIOLENTÈDEATHÈEGÈGUNSHOTÈLANDMINEÈAERIALÈ
bombardment) 
sÈ 0ERSECUTIONÈOFÈSPECIFICÈGROUPS
sÈ 2ESPONSIBILITYÈOFÈDIFFERENTÈPERPETRATORS
sÈ #AUSALÈLINKSÈBETWEENÈCOMBATANTÈACTIONSÈEGÈ)(,ÈVIOLATIONSÈ
forced displacement, denial of relief access, etc.) and indirect 
mortality 
Measurement tools currently 
available
sÈ 0ROSPECTIVEÈSURVEILLANCEÈRECOMMENDED	
sÈ 2ETROSPECTIVEÈSURVEYS
sÈ 2ETROSPECTIVEÈSURVEYS
sÈ $EMOGRAPHICÈTOOLSÈEGÈLIFEÈTABLEÈANALYSIS	È
sÈ %XHAUSTIVEÈVICTIMÈIDENTIFICATION
sÈ -ULTIPLEÈSYSTEMSÈESTIMATIONÈCAPTUREnRECAPTURE	ÈBASEDÈONÈ
individual lists
Importance of baseline data 
(mortality estimates in the pre-crisis 
period)
sÈ ,OWÈATÈTHEÈOUTSETÈSEVERITYÈCANÈBEÈBENCHMARKEDÈBROADLYÈBASEDÈONÈ
the expected range of non-crisis mortality in similar settings (e.g., 
0.3 to 0.6 per 10,000 person-days in sub-Saharan Africa); data from 
the setting itself are however preferable
sÈ (IGHÈCALCULATIONÈOFÈEXCESSÈMORTALITYÈRELIESÈONÈACCURATEÈ
baseline mortality data
Sampling requirements sÈ .OTÈANÈISSUEÈIFÈSURVEILLANCEÈISÈIMPLEMENTEDÈHOWEVERÈFLUCTUATIONSÈ
over small periods and populations need careful interpretation 
[80]
sÈ )FÈSURVEYSÈAREÈIMPLEMENTED
  For benchmarking severity at the outset, the sampling design 
should enable “reasonably” precise estimates of CMR and U5MR 
(i.e., enough to infer an abnormal elevation)
  For crisis monitoring, high sampling precision is needed to infer 
trends over time
sÈ 4HEÈSURVEYÈSAMPLEÈSIZEÈSHOULDÈENABLEÈPRECISEÈESTIMATIONÈ
of the attributable risk of death (comparison of mortality in 
crisis versus pre-crisis)
sÈ %XPLICITÈSTRATIFICATIONÈISÈDESIRABLEÈSOÈASÈTOÈOBTAINÈINDEPENDENTÈ
estimates for vulnerable sub-groups of interest
sÈ 0OSTSAMPLINGÈSTRATIFICATIONÈISÈDISCOURAGED
Period of analysis (or recall period if 
a retrospective survey is done)
sÈ 3URVEILLANCEÈREALTIMEÈANALYSISÈSHOULDÈBEÈDONEÈONÈAÈDAILYÈORÈ
weekly basis
sÈ 3URVEYSÈTHEÈPERIODÈSHOULDÈBEÈSHORTÈSOÈASÈTOÈREFLECTÈCURRENTÈ
conditions (however, this entails a serious loss in precision)
sÈ )DEALLYÈSHOULDÈINVESTIGATEÈTHEÈENTIREÈPERIODÈSINCEÈCRISISÈ
onset, plus sufficient person-time in the pre-crisis period to 
establish an accurate baseline
Main methodological challenges sÈ $EVELOPINGÈSIMPLEÈSUSTAINABLEÈANDÈACCURATEÈSURVEILLANCEÈSYSTEMS
sÈ 5NBIASEDÈSAMPLINGÈOFÈHOUSEHOLDSÈ;=
sÈ 6ALIDÈASCERTAINMENTÈOFÈCAUSESÈOFÈDEATHÈ;=
sÈ $ETERMININGÈBASELINEÈFORÈEXCESSÈCALCULATION
sÈ %LICITINGÈACCURATEÈRECALLÈOFÈEVENTSÈDEATHSÈBIRTHSÈMIGRATIONS	È
over long periods
sÈ $EALINGÈWITHÈDYNAMICÈCOHORTSÈIEÈHOUSEHOLDÈFRAGMENTATIONÈ
and mixing)
CMR, crude mortality rate: U5MR, under-five mortality rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050146.t001
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rate estimates and confidence 
intervals.
Most surveys are commissioned 
for immediate operational purposes 
[16], but they suffer from a number of 
weaknesses: (1) analysis and reporting 
may take weeks; (2) results reflect 
mortality in the past rather than 
current mortality rates; (3) confidence 
intervals often overlap emergency 
thresholds, and there is usually 
insufficient power to detect trends in 
time; (4) very recent periods cannot 
be looked at without unfeasible sample 
sizes; and (5) since cluster sampling 
is almost always used (see below), 
estimates for different sub-regions 
within the surveyed area cannot be 
generated, unless stratification is built 
into the sampling design a priori [17]. 
In short, surveys are of limited use for 
emergency relief operations.
Survey implementation is often 
haphazard and fraught with biases 
[18,19], and surveys conducted during 
complex humanitarian emergencies 
are prone to several methodological 
limitations [20]. In most crises, lists of 
households are non-existent and the 
residential layout is chaotic, making 
simple or systematic random sampling 
difficult. An alternative sampling design 
that is commonly employed, even 
though it is less precise and more prone 
to bias, is multi-stage cluster sampling 
[20]: the first stages involve random 
selection of n1 cluster starting points in 
the population sampling frame, while 
the last stage entails sampling of n2 
households around each point.
Allocation of cluster points to 
communities (e.g., villages, camps) 
within the sampling universe (target 
population for the survey) is usually 
proportional to the population size 
of the communities, which leads to 
some bias towards high population 
density areas. When communities’ 
locations and sizes are unknown, spatial 
sampling of random global positioning 
system (GPS) coordinates is an option. 
This approach is biased towards low 
density communities, although the bias 
can be controlled for [21]. There is 
insufficient evidence on the minimum 
number of clusters needed to ensure 
statistical robustness under different 
mortality conditions (i.e., magnitude 
of the mortality rate, degree to which 
deaths are clustered together in space), 
and on the incremental precision 
benefit of adding more clusters.
Household sampling within clusters 
usually relies on a technique known as 
“spin-the-pen,” whereby a household 
along an imaginary line running from 
the centre to the edge of the community 
is sampled first, and further households 
are selected through a proximity 
rule (e.g., next closest). This method 
can entail selection bias and reduce 
precision; alternatives include sampling 
random GPS coordinates [22] or 
mapping a segment of the community 
and doing systematic sampling therein 
[17]. The question is mainly one of 
cost–benefit: how much bias can be 
eliminated by introducing potentially 
more resource-intensive sampling 
designs? Further research, particularly 
based on mathematical simulation, is 
needed to optimise sampling choices.
Various questionnaires have been 
used to elicit information on deaths, 
but there has been little comparison 
of their reliability. Next-of-kin reports 
about non-violent cause of death may 
be unreliable; full verbal autopsies 
(interviewing the next-of-kin to try to 
establish the cause of death based on 
reported signs and symptoms) [23] 
may be impracticable in emergency 
surveys, but simplified versions could 
be developed to classify causes of death 
broadly and prioritise health relief 
interventions [17].
Despite the limitations of surveys, 
they will remain important for relief 
operations, as they can establish 
mortality levels at the outset of 
an intervention or supplement 
failing surveillance. However, their 
commissioning must be more rational 
and quality needs to improve.
Surveys are also a critical tool 
for advocacy and documentation 
[24–32]. However, since they are often 
conceived to address operational 
questions, they may not investigate 
person-time (i.e., the total amount 
of time that a cohort of people are at 
risk) in which most mortality occurred. 
During long recall periods in situations 
of war and displacement, the sampled 
cohort is dynamic: households undergo 
fragmentation and re-composition, 
with migration within and outside; 
individuals may enter the at-risk group 
at different times (e.g., if displacement 
is gradual); and the communities 
investigated may be remnants of larger 
groups that were together before the 
crisis [31]. For example, the Karen and 
Karenni communities in eastern Burma 
have split among forced displacement 
sites, Thai refugee camps, and villages 
of origin [26,33]). In such cases, well-
designed questionnaires are needed 
to track each individual’s time of entry 
and exit from the at-risk cohort, and 
the definition of “at risk” needs to be 
explicit.
Other methods. Demographic 
methods that attempt to analyse 
Box 1. Suggested List of Key 
Future Actions for Better 
Mortality Documentation in 
Crises
sÈ $EFINEÈBESTÈPRACTICESÈANDÈDEVELOPÈ
simple tools for emergency mortality 
surveillance implementation and 
analysis.
sÈ 0ROMOTEÈANDÈIMPLEMENTÈPROSPECTIVEÈ
surveillance systems as soon as 
possible after the onset of the crisis.
sÈ %NHANCEÈCOMMUNICATIONÈAMONGÈ
researchers, policy makers, the 
media, and civil society to widen 
understanding of the strengths and 
limitations of various sources of 
mortality information in crises.
sÈ 4RAINÈAÈCADREÈOFÈJUNIORÈFIELDÈRESEARCHERSÈ
in emergency surveillance and survey 
methods, including NGO and UN staff, 
academics, and local government 
scientists.
sÈ #OMPAREÈVARIOUSÈAPPROACHESÈTOÈ
mortality estimation, and, if necessary, 
do studies to establish the relative 
validity of various methods (including 
sampling and questionnaire designs).
sÈ %XPLOREÈNEWÈMETHODSÈFORÈREMOTEÈ
data collection (including remote 
surveys and satellite data analysis) 
and mortality prediction (including 
mathematical modelling).
sÈ %STABLISHÈAÈGLOBALÈPROCESSÈFORÈ
evaluating the performance of 
donors by monitoring key indicators 
of population health in their funded 
projects, including mortality.
sÈ %STABLISHÈANÈINDEPENDENTÈBODYÈINÈ
charge of collecting mortality data on 
a systematic basis, especially in under-
publicised and under-funded crises.
sÈ %STABLISHÈANÈINDEPENDENTÈEXPERTÈPANELÈ
(possibly housed within the above 
body) to arbitrate disputes about study 
validity, review study protocols and 
reports, and define best practices for 
mortality data collection in crises.
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the age–sex composition of the 
population [34] have been used to 
indirectly estimate excess mortality 
(see below) by combining census, 
fertility, child mortality, or sibling and 
parent survival data with the expected 
age–sex structures of the population 
investigated (“model life tables”) [35]. 
Major drawbacks of this approach 
are that crisis-affected populations 
often do not fit these expected 
structures, and that crisis settings 
violate the assumptions of constant 
conditions over periods of months or 
years inherent in many demographic 
methods.
“Body counts” usually capture only 
a fraction of actual deaths, ignore 
indirect mortality (deaths not caused 
directly by violent trauma in a conflict 
but by the deterioration in health 
services and increased risk of disease 
attributable to the violence), and 
indicate at best a minimum death toll 
directly attributable to violence. In 
nearly all crises, most deaths occur 
outside health facilities and are 
not reported to government offices 
or by media [36]. In Iraq, morgue 
reports over the first 2.5 years of 
occupation tallied to about 45 violent 
deaths per 100,000 per year [37], a 
rate comparable to that observed in 
Baltimore and Washington, D.C., 
lower than in New Orleans [38,39], 
and implying a less than 10% rise over 
the baseline despite circumstantial 
evidence to the contrary [40].
Active identification of victims often 
requires years of painstaking work, 
and may never be complete, but it 
has value for legal documentation. In 
Bosnia, nearly 100,000 war fatalities 
were individually ascertained [41]. 
Where several individual lists of deaths 
are available, capture–recapture 
estimation, a method developed in 
ecology, can infer the total death toll, 
including deaths not recorded on 
any lists, by analysing the overlap of 
different lists, as in Guatemala [42] and 
Kosovo [43].
New technology deserves 
consideration for improving estimates, 
especially in hard-to-access populations. 
High-resolution satellite images of 
Darfurian villages being attacked 
or destroyed are now available 
[44,45]. Satellite photographs could 
allow for remote burial monitoring. 
Expanding telecommunications 
may enable sentinel surveillance 
(whereby specific sites are selected 
for prospective monitoring on the 
assumption that trends at these sites 
reflect the population experience) or 
snowball sampling (whereby a given 
type of respondent, e.g., a member 
of a household that experienced an 
attack, refers the researcher to other 
similar households, and so forth, thus 
building an iterative sample). One of 
us (LR) asked Columbia University 
students to interview a convenience 
sample of Baghdad residents contacted 
by telephone or e-mail about violent 
deaths near their homes since the 2003 
invasion; data were then compared 
to media reports to assess the latter’s 
completeness [46].
Excess mortality estimation. 
Accumulating evidence shows that 
in most wars, mortality indirectly 
attributable to violence (due to 
disruption of health services, 
displacement into unsanitary camps, 
food insecurity, etc.) far exceeds 
that due to intentional injury [47]. 
Documenting this total excess mortality 
entails estimating the rates of all-cause 
mortality that can be attributed to the 
crisis, and then projecting them to 
the entire person-time at risk during 
the crisis. This requires a baseline 
rate, namely mortality that would 
have occurred in the absence of a 
crisis. However, this baseline rate is 
immeasurable [48], and so pre-crisis 
mortality is usually adopted instead 
[49]. Alternatively, the baseline rate is 
taken to be mortality in neighbouring 
“control” populations with similar 
demographic and epidemiological 
characteristics that are unaffected by 
crisis [50]; however, selecting these 
controls presents obvious difficulties 
because no two populations are truly 
the same and because assumptions 
of similarity cannot be tested once a 
conflict begins. Available pre-crisis 
mortality estimates come from census 
or national health surveys, but they 
are often imprecise at administrative 
levels below the national level, or may 
be outdated, especially in chronic 
crises (e.g., Burundi, Afghanistan). 
Sensitivity analysis of different scenarios 
is prudent in such cases. Alternatively, 
surveys can establish a baseline by 
investigating pre-crisis person-time, 
though long periods may introduce 
biases with event recall.
Evidence suggests that household-
level IHL violations are associated 
with all-cause mortality [51]. Future 
mortality studies could elucidate 
these causal links further by explicitly 
exploring violent exposures as a 
determinant.
Commissioning, Interpretation, 
and Use of Mortality Data
The role of different players. Ideally, 
local governments should spearhead 
data collection, but often lack technical 
capacity or have no interest in 
documenting the impact of conflicts to 
which they are parties.
The United Nations (UN) system’s 
track record of documenting mortality 
and IHL violations is poor. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) has a 
mandate [52], but most expertise 
is confined to headquarters, and 
though we are unaware of detailed 
analyses of WHO’s work in individual 
crises, our experience suggests that its 
decentralised country offices, especially 
in Africa, are often unwilling to 
challenge governments [53].
One of the few WHO mortality 
surveys ever done in a crisis [54] was 
critical to scaling up relief in Darfur. 
But the UN has done little mortality 
measurement in most crisis settings 
including Chechnya, Angola [55], 
Burma, Zimbabwe [56], West Africa, 
and the Central African Republic. We 
believe that, by not commissioning 
data collection, the UN may diminish 
its diplomatic ability to pursue conflict 
resolution and civilian protection 
based on evidence. Furthermore, by 
not upholding existing reliable figures, 
the UN may undermine the credibility 
of data collecting agencies and enable 
parties responsible for conflict to 
dismiss the data as partisan.
Non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), human rights organisations, 
and academics have partly filled the 
data collection void [16], but have 
variable technical expertise [18], 
are often characterised in the press 
or by parties to the conflict as being 
biased and agenda-driven, and can 
easily be barred from working by host 
governments. The influence of their 
findings on policy has probably been 
minimal in Burma and Iraq, and 
moderate in the DRC [57] and Darfur 
[58,59].
Donors should enhance the 
accountability of the humanitarian 
projects they fund by encouraging 
collection of mortality data. However, 
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demonstrating the mortality impact 
of specific funded interventions (e.g., 
water provision) generally requires 
complex study designs [60] and is 
rarely needed, since evidence on the 
effectiveness of these interventions 
(e.g., vaccination; vector control) 
often already exists. What needs to be 
documented instead is their coverage 
among targeted beneficiaries. On 
the other hand, some assessment of 
the impact of the relief operation 
as a whole can be done through 
mortality surveillance or surveys, 
provided contextual information is 
used to interpret findings and correctly 
attribute causality. However, inter-
agency coordination is needed to 
implement mortality studies that cover 
the entire crisis-affected population.
Generally, UN, governmental, 
and other agencies involved in long-
term development have not adapted 
their toolbox to fast-evolving crises. 
They have relied instead on bulky, 
infrequent demographic assessments 
such as the Multi-Indicator Cluster 
Surveys or Demographic and Health 
Surveys (nationwide surveys employing 
large samples and complex designs 
that collect data on a wide range of 
health, nutrition, and household 
livelihood indicators). While these 
types of assessments are needed to 
track development goals, they require 
up to a year for reporting and generate 
mortality estimates centred several 
years in the past. Epidemiologists 
measure mortality as an incidence rate, 
while demographers typically rely on 
previous birth histories and indirect 
methods; inter-disciplinary dialogue 
would help to harness the best of 
both disciplines for crisis conditions 
specifically.
To improve data commissioning, 
methods should be streamlined and 
standardised for the benefit of non-
academic agencies, who will likely 
remain the main data producers. 
The Standardized Monitoring and 
Assessment of Relief and Transition 
(SMART) initiative (see http://www.
smartindicators.org/), an interagency 
initiative to improve monitoring and 
evaluation of humanitarian assistance 
interventions, has developed a standard 
survey protocol for mortality and 
nutritional anthropometry to support 
relief operations [61]. The protocol 
includes automated data management 
software, which NGOs such as Action 
Against Hunger are adopting; this tool 
should be disseminated more widely.
Technical capacity must be scaled 
up through focused training on 
emergency epidemiology methods for 
both researchers and policy makers. 
The expert pool is overstretched and 
experiences high turnover, as with most 
humanitarian professionals [62]. Most 
public health schools do not teach 
emergency epidemiology methods 
in depth, and opportunities for skills 
handover are mostly on the job; many 
agencies thus work in isolation and 
produce invalid data.
Political sensitivities of mortality 
data. Mortality information can be 
politically inflammatory and prone 
to manipulation. Households may 
hide deaths if they occurred among 
combatants or victims of persecution, 
or if the reporting of deaths would 
result in a smaller aid ration [63]. 
Relief agencies may dispute mortality 
findings that suggest minimal 
impact of their relief efforts, or 
support them if they attract donor 
interest. At country or international 
levels, opposition parties, advocacy 
organisations, and the media may 
use findings to further their claims 
[1]. Combatants will generally reject 
findings that show their actions have 
led to massive death or that expose a 
hidden crisis. The North Korean [64] 
and Zimbabwean [65] governments 
initially denied extraordinary food 
crises. Rwanda rejected mortality 
findings from areas of the DRC where 
it had intervened militarily (L. Roberts, 
personal observation). The Russian 
government hindered investigations 
of disappearances in Chechnya [66]. 
Sudan’s president claimed only 9,000 
died in Darfur [67], despite various 
studies that reported a far greater 
number [58,59,68–70]. Leaders of the 
coalition of countries that invaded 
Iraq in 2003 dismissed survey estimates 
of 601,000 deaths due to violent 
trauma over the first 40 months after 
the invasion [48]; a lower estimate 
(151,000) [71] has not met with such 
scepticism.
A 2005 report from northern 
Uganda by WHO and partners 
[72] yielded a typical scenario. The 
government rejected the report and 
barred its publication; pro-government 
media criticised it; an NGO coalition 
used it to denounce the crisis; and an 
opposition figure claimed genocide; 
while the UN country team, including 
agencies sponsoring the survey, 
remained silent [73].
From local to crisis-wide estimates. 
Estimates covering the entire 
crisis (both chronologically and 
geographically) are more powerful in 
policy terms than disparate data from 
various locations and periods. However, 
the latter situation is typical: to our 
knowledge, in the past decade real-time 
crisis-wide data were only available for 
the DRC [28] and Iraq [71,74], though 
estimates were derived for Kosovo 
[30,43,75] and Timor-Leste [76] after 
peace broke out.
Crisis-wide syntheses of patchwork 
data can provide an overall picture, 
but extrapolation of available findings 
to person-time not covered by data 
collection is a treacherous task, subject 
to fragile assumptions. In Darfur, 
insufficient data have led to widely 
divergent extrapolation estimates. For 
example, projections for September 
2003 to February 2004, when violence 
levels were highest, are based solely on 
three localised surveys done in West 
Darfur, which altogether covered less 
than 15% of person-time at risk during 
that period. Reliable baseline mortality 
data for Darfur are unavailable, and 
different projections adopt baseline 
levels ranging from 0 to 0.6 deaths per 
10,000 person-days. Insecure areas of 
South Darfur have never been surveyed 
[70].
Improvements could be explored, 
such as spatial modelling of mortality 
risk based on circumstantial 
information (e.g., reports of attacks, 
nutritional crises, epidemics, 
displacement dynamics) and evidence 
of the statistical association between 
these factors and mortality. Such spatial 
modelling is currently being used to 
analyse food security in Somalia [77]. 
Extrapolative exercises, however, are 
only a partial substitute for timely 
data collection that is representative 
of all person-time: the latter requires 
coordination, funding, and, most 
importantly, access by researchers to 
affected populations.
Understanding statistics. When 
done in settings without many other 
sources of information, studies can 
become high-profile events, as in the 
DRC [28] and Iraq [25], attracting 
non-specialists’ attention. Global 
political and human rights activism, 
sustained by greater access to media 
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and the Internet, is now a force to be 
reckoned with. Increased information 
flow carries ethical responsibilities for 
those generating and reporting on 
data. Debate around Iraq mortality 
estimates flourished not just among 
experts, but in wider academic circles, 
generalist media, and particularly the 
blogosphere. A common critique was 
that survey estimates of 500 violent 
deaths per day were implausible, as 
they implied that the media were 
largely missing a daily catastrophe 
[78]. Understandably, journalists 
and the general public view palpable 
body counts as being more reliable, 
and researchers struggle to convey 
the inherent superiority of estimation 
based on representative sampling. In 
African crises, where media coverage 
is far weaker, excess mortality is largely 
due to small arms and disease, and 
thus even more imperceptible, though 
it may continue for years and affect 
millions.
Insecurity is an underappreciated 
constraint to mortality documentation. 
Most data are generated after fighting 
subsides and the crisis is no longer 
under the international spotlight. 
Studies are often done in areas where 
locals are not free to report atrocities 
or corroborate statistical estimates. 
Wishing to minimise risk of physical 
harm for interviewers and respondents, 
researchers tend to design small surveys 
with wide confidence intervals, giving 
the data an added aura of unreliability. 
Iraq has provided a rare opportunity 
for policy makers, journalists, and 
civil society to consider different 
mortality data sources. However, more 
dialogue needs to occur among these 
stakeholders and researchers so as to 
increase non-specialists’ familiarity 
with statistical estimation and the 
hierarchy of different types of evidence. 
Methods that are population-based 
(i.e., designed to capture or estimate 
all deaths, including those that 
occur outside health facilities or are 
unreported to government systems or 
journalists) should generally be viewed 
as superior. Crisis-wide surveys, as in the 
DRC, are preferable to extrapolation 
of disparate data, as in Darfur. 
However, single survey estimates may 
feature biases that, when projected 
to the entire population and period 
(person-time) represented by the 
sample, can cause serious inaccuracies. 
Independent replications of surveys 
or the simultaneous implementation 
of other population-based methods 
enhance the strength of inference 
and reduce the scope for speculation. 
After the Kosovo war, three studies 
[30,43,75] yielded remarkably similar 
estimates of 10,000 to 12,000 killings. 
In Iraq, the 10-fold difference among 
violent death toll estimates mainly 
reflects a comparison between 
surveys and body counts, as well as 
heterogeneous analysis periods [48,74]. 
Conclusion: A Dedicated Body to 
Monitor Mortality? 
How many of the more than 3 million 
estimated to have died in the DRC 
because of war [28] might still be 
alive if credible, crisis-wide mortality 
estimates had become available sooner, 
and been used to inform policy? 
The establishment of a technical, 
apolitical body dedicated to timely, 
systematic collection of valid mortality 
data, especially in the least funded 
and publicised crises, could help to 
ensure that the DRC experience is 
not repeated. Such a body could also 
independently evaluate mortality study 
protocols and reports, promote best-
practice methods, and train a cadre of 
researchers to be deployed to emergent 
crises. Such a body could constitute 
a resource for relief agencies and 
improve the quality of press coverage 
and discussion around ongoing crises. 
The fledgling Health and Nutrition 
Tracking Service [79], currently hosted 
by WHO, proposes to coordinate 
some of the above tasks. If housed 
within a UN agency or government, 
its effectiveness might be stymied by 
negotiations between UN headquarters, 
the UN country office, and the host 
government. Whatever its positioning 
(we suggest autonomy from all existing 
institutions; Spiegel proposes ad 
hoc bodies for each crisis [18]), its 
independence will be a key success 
determinant, and could be fostered 
through the following measures: (1) 
non-earmarked, long-term funding by 
a very broad spectrum of donors, with 
preference for politically neutral ones; 
(2) ability to pursue projects without 
consulting donors; (3) involvement 
of experts based on technical merit 
alone; and (4) independent review by a 
contracted firm and/or representatives 
from civil society, especially from crisis-
affected populations. The monitoring 
of war prisoners by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross could 
serve as a model.
The expression “a matter of life and 
death” must have an equivalent in 
almost every language. Documenting 
mortality is itself a matter of life and 
death, since it can instigate better relief 
assistance and greater adherence to 
IHL, and possibly influence humans’ 
future relationship with their kind and 
the environment. We can do far better: 
failure to do so will be our collective 
loss. 
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